A multisecret sharing (MSS) is a method for sharing a set of secrets among some participants. They can recover each of these secrets without endangering the other secrets. Two kinds of security models have been proposed for MSS schemes. These models are categorized into 2 types. The first security model is unconditional security. This approach decreases the efficiency of MSS schemes. Therefore, the second type of security, which is more relaxed, appeared. This approach is called computational security. In this paper, with 2 examples, we will show that the current definition of computational security does not satisfy all of our expectations from a secure MSS scheme. In fact, in these examples, recovering a secret leaks information to the other secrets while these schemes are considered secure in view of the computational security. After determining the shortcomings of the current security definition, we propose a new definition for computational security and present an MSS scheme that enjoys rigorous proof of security in terms of the new definition. In addition, a complete comparison in terms of share size, number of public values, and required operations for recovering a secret between our scheme and previous schemes indicates that the presented scheme is efficient.
